Pregnant Lady in the Office

Tribunal evaluates sexual harassment and accommodation allegations of pregnant employee

The case of Perez v. Estate of Tony De Melo and Lucia Mera, 2025 HRTO 295 concerns a claim of sexual harassment related to the Applicant’s pregnancy as well as a claim of a failure to accommodate her pregnancy-related disabilities.[1]

Candy Perez (the “Applicant”) was employed as a building superintendent for an apartment building owned by Tony De Melo (“De Melo”), who lived with his spouse, Lucia Mera (“Mera”) (collectively the “Respondents”). As superintendent, the Applicant’s duties included cleaning, maintaining the building and collecting rent from tenants. In exchange for this work, instead of payment, De Melo permitted the Applicant to live in a unit rent-free.

After the Applicant became pregnant, and informed the Respondents of the same, the Applicant had an encounter with the Respondent, who made several comments about her pregnancy and her body, including regarding the size of her belly and her genitalia. He also commented, “Can you let me see?”, and when denied by the Applicant, “Why not? I just want to see, not touch.”[2]

Around this time, the Applicant informed the Respondents that she would require accommodation after giving birth, with respect to her superintendent duties. She indicated that she would not be able to carry out the cleaning and maintenance duties. The Respondents told her to find someone else to help her with her duties. When she approached them a second time about her request for accommodation, De Melo similarly told her to find someone else to assist her or to leave her position. Shortly thereafter, the applicant resigned and filed a complaint with the Human Rights Tribunal.

 

Harassment – When is One Incident is Sufficient?

While a pattern or course of conduct is often required to establish harassment, this case reaffirms this is not always the case. The Respondent’s comments during this single incident about the applicant’s belly and genitalia were found to amount to comment and conduct that was known or ought reasonably to be known to be unwelcome. The Tribunal reasoned the Respondent’s behaviour clearly made the Applicant “feel uncomfortable and distressed and a reasonable person would have known that comments and conduct was unwelcome”.[3]

Regarding the issue that the definition of harassment requires a “course” of vexatious comment or conduct, the Tribunal noted that there were multiple offensive comments made during the meeting in question. Additionally, the Tribunal confirmed that even a single event can meet the threshold for harassment in particular circumstances.[4]  In this case, the Tribunal indicated that, while the comments regarding the Applicant’s belly, on their own, may not have satisfied the definition, “De Melo’s reference to the relationship of the Applicant’s belly to her vagina went beyond the use of offensive language and more objectively had the effect of demeaning and objectifying the applicant and an affront to her dignity”. Thus, the Tribunal viewed the Respondent’s conduct as serious enough to meet the threshold for when a single incident will amount to harassment.

As the Tribunal had no trouble finding that the other elements of the test had been met, namely, De Melo was the Applicant’s employer, the behaviour occurred in the workplace and occurred due to the Applicant’s sex and pregnancy, the Tribunal held that De Melo’s conduct amounted to sexual harassment and discrimination under the Code.

 

Accommodation is a two-way street

The Tribunal then dealt with the Applicant’s claim that the Respondents failed to accommodate her pregnancy-related physical limitations.

The Tribunal found that there was no breach of the duty to accommodate. The Tribunal accepted that the Applicant may have some limitations after giving birth. However, with respect to the substantive duty to accommodate, the Tribunal confirmed that it is “not unlimited”, but rather, “defined by the concepts of ‘reasonable accommodation’ and ‘undue hardship’”. The Tribunal further reiterated the principles derived from its jurisprudence that:

…an employer is not required to fundamentally change working conditions and the duty to accommodate does not require an employer to assign the essential duties of an employee with a disability to other employees or to hire another employee to perform these essential duties in the employee’s place.  Further an employer is not required to change the essential duties and requirements of a position so that an employee can meet them.[5]

In concluding that the Respondents did not have a duty to accommodate in this case, the Tribunal noted that the duties the Applicant had indicated she would be unable to perform, namely, the cleaning and maintenance duties, were “the primary focus and essential daily duties” of her position.

The Tribunal also found that the Respondents met their procedural obligations. The Tribunal noted that the Respondents had engaged in discussions with the Applicant regarding her accommodation request and that they suggested reasonable options for her to consider including having her spouse assist, which the Applicant rejected. Although the Tribunal accepted that the accommodation dialogue may have been brief, it considered the Respondents’ efforts sufficient to satisfy the procedural duty to accommodate.

 

Takeaways

This case is instructive with regard to assessing when a single incident may meet the threshold for establishing harassment, indicating that more than “offensive language” is required.[6] It does suggest that the existence of demeaning and objectifying comments which offend an individual’s dignity may render the conduct sufficiently serious. This case is also helpful with respect to determining the limits of an employer’s duty to accommodate, affirming that an employer is not required to change the essential duties of a position.

[1] Sexual harassment is a form of sex-based discrimination, see: Janzen v Platy Enterprises Ltd. [1989] CanLII 97 (SCC).

[2] Para. 49.

[3] Para. 59.

[4] Para. 60.

[5] Para. 66.

[6] Para. 60.